Analysis of a Democratic Loss. What can Democrats learn?
Intro
By election day, Representative Baron Hill’s defeat was understood. But the margin of Republican challenger Todd Young’s victory was not anticipated. Young’s 10 percent lead suggests a significant political shift. Rep. Hill was serving his 10th year in Congress after reclaiming Indiana’s 9th District seat in 2006. As a more moderate, “Blue Dog Democrat,” Hill had kept pace in the election until election day approached — but were voters simply following the rest of the nation by backing Young’s fiscal conservatism, or did Young’s campaign effectively engineer his win?
Careful consideration reveals how Todd Young built a compelling narrative for 9th District voters. Voters who weren’t enthusiastic about Hill found that they had little reason to turn out for him, and this feeling was strengthened by the realization that Hill’s Victory was becoming increasingly unlikely day after day.
The 9th
Comprising Southeastern Indiana, the 9th Congressional District is politically diverse. It includes rural and urban areas engaged in a variety of industries. It encompasses Bloomington, the college town home of Indiana University, which brings research interests and student activists to the table. The 2000 Census showed that the 9th District lacks racial diversity — over 90% of its residents are White/Caucasian. The Cook Political Report lists the 9th district as having a PVI of R+6 — a Republican win by 6 percentage points. The district’s conservative bent probably arises from being nearly unilaterally white, among other demographic indicators that suggest a heavy Republican presence.
Despite Cook’s reporting of predisposition for Republicans, the district had been safe for Democrats until 2005, mostly thanks to the famous Lee H. Hamilton, who held the seat for 34 years, or 17 elections. Hamilton retired in 1998, leaving the seat open to Baron Hill. In 2004, Hill lost res-election to Republican Mike Sodrel. Sodrel’s victory was the first Republican victory in the seat since 1958, indicating a major paradigm shift in the attitudes of the district’s voters. While Hill regained the seat in 2006, confidence in Democratic representation was no longer a guarantee in the district.
Voter Unrest
While Hill had served the district for a long time, he did much to earn the ire of the public going into election season. Hill, the leader of the moderate Democrats known as the ‘Blue Dog Democrats,’ voted for House healthcare reform measures after the intense negotiation. Blue Dogs had held out on the bill for as long as possible, and Hill’s decision was instrumental in securing the necessary votes for the reform measure to pass. Necessary legislation or not, the vote alienated conservative Democrats and moderates in the district. Hill could easily had anticipated how difficult his healthcare position would make his relection; he was experience the fallout as early as August 29. The RNC accused Hill of folding like a lawn-chair, an apt analogy for a Blue Dog who is supposed to engender middle-of-the-road politics and commit to fiscal responsibility.
Hill’s position on several committees such as the Energy and Commerce and the Joint Economic Committee put pressure on him to perform on the hill while neglecting constituents at home — his position on the Energy and Commerce committee led to support for the American Clean Energy and Security Act, widely known as the cap and trade bill of summer 2009. Like its healthcare counterpart, the bill is considered by fiscal conservatives an example of outrageous spending and regulation on the part of Democrats.
Moreover, Hill had already faced defeat in the 9th District once before. Clearly the prospect of losing in 2010 occurred to Hill while he was making legislative decisions. Convinced that the reforms were a step in the right direction for the entire nation, Hill set out to convince the same to his voters.
Todd Young
Todd Young’s rise to prominence in the 9th District seemed rather natural. Young had been an adjunct professor at the Indiana University and also had experience as a legislative staffer working on energy policy. He had prepared for public service his entire life, starting with his attendance at the Naval Academy. Young is also a staunch fiscal conservative, president of a watchdog organization called the National Organization for People vs. Irresponsible Government Spending (NOPIGS). Naturally, this puts Young in direct opposition to Baron Hill and made him stand out against other Republican competitors in the primary.
His victory in the primary over former Representative Mike Sodrel suggests that the Republicans were seeking a new approach in 2010 — not to mention a new face. Although Rep. Sodrel had defeated Hill in 2004, the fiscal overtones of the 2010 election indicated the need for change. Young was also a younger candidate, and without a losing track record, exempted from much of the pessimism directed at the other primary candidates.
Young’s candidacy stood in stark opposition to Sodrel’s not only through his pure fiscal conservatism but through his freshness: despite having served as a legislative assistant and working at conservative thinktank The Heritage Foundation, Young offered a refreshing distance from the legacies of Reps. Hamilton and Hill. Moreover, support from established part figures like Dan Quayle played heavily into his ability to rally the GOP and break any inertia it might have had in supporting Sodrel.
Victory in the Republican primary was not a seamless process; since Sodrel was also well-established withing the Republican part and had previously defeated the incumbent, of course the primary was competitive. Sodrel threatened to sue Young’s campaign over an advertisement that accused Sodrel of voting for 23,000 earmarks in a single term. Despite several rounds of volleying, Sodrel’s campaign never followed through and he finished 3rd in the primary.
Focus on Sodrel’s earkmark votes indicated that beyond any doubt, fiscal responsibility would be the key issue for Indiana’s 9th District in the 2010 election. Young’s accusations were perfectly characteristic and his lack of a voting record worked to his advantage — there was very little ground on which he could be labeled a hypocrite. At the end of the Republican primary, the onus was on Hill to prove that healthcare, stimulus packages, and myriad other reforms under the Obama administration were necessary, or necessary evils.
Hill Campaign Strategy
A telling quote from Hill at a fundraiser perfectly explained the direction of the election: regarding running against Young, Hill said, “It’s a little weird. It’s an adjustment. I don’t know much about Todd Young.” In a targeted district where Sodrel had proven that Republican victory was possible, once could have easily anticipated Young’s victory even though the race was officially labelled as a toss-up. Even Republican polls had shown Young losing, but many voters were undecided; one Republican-backed poll showed Hill leading 41-34 in the summer. The numbers dont exactly add up to 100%. A better indicator is this poll: Voters in the 9th district wanted healthcare repealed and half of all polled voters were “very motivated.”
Hill extolled the virtues of healthcare reform and defended his vote until the end — and as the leader of the Blue Dog Democrats, he was essentially forced to. Waffling leadership would probably have been worse, especially since Hill was on record saying that he was voting for healthcare reform even if he lost re-election, saying, “I’ll look back knowing that I made the right vote.”
Hill positioned himself as a ‘martyr’ in that his failure to be re-elected would really be the failure of votersto understand his actions as a delegate to the House of Representatives. His refusal to backpedal obviously ran against the majority view, but was defensible in that healthcare reform ostensibly reduced the budget deficit and was thus a fiscally responsible Act. But this detail was overlooked when defining Hill as the “respectable delegate looking out for his constituency.”
This was probably a bad idea when Young had already lost the seat once. Hill’s steadfast support for the healthcare bill was obstinate and irresponsible to conservatives who saw themselves as an unrepresented majority. Whether or not it was true, conservatives had a cause — whether or not they had a good candidate. Hill’s alienating defense positioned him as undemocratic and uncaring for his constituency.
Hill’s offence focused on characterizing Young as militantly conservative. A cornerstone of his campaign was a remark Young made comparing Social Security to a ponzi scheme. Hill’s campaign also accused Young of wishing to destroy the Department of Energy and Department of Education. Young’s dedication to fiscal responsibility could certainly be seen as radical — numerous are dependent on Social Security and attempts to modify these large systems have garnered serious controversy, as happened in the Bush administration.
Hill also turned climate change denial into a campaign issue: Young, who claimed that climate science is a “hoax perpetrated by leftist ideologues,” could not possibly be a rational, responsible candidate if he denied something as plainly obvious as climate change, which is supported by scientific documentation as well as the broad academic consensus. Hill responded: “this is God’s green earth and we ought to respect it.” Hill cited Ronald Reagan’s own cap-and-trade measures as precedent for his vote in support of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, decrying opposition as special interests who aim to perpetuate climate change denial as a means for their own economic objectives. While Hill had the upper hand in this area, especially given the preponderance of citable scientific evidence, and not to mention the easily exploitable wackiness of many climate change deniers, it may have arisen far too late in the campaign season for voters to have taken it as a serious warning regarding Young’s inexperience. Conservative voters clearly saw it as a desperate bid to retain the seat and a red herring from his blatant betrayal on healthcare. Moreover, climate change is not exactly a polarizing issue where its effects have yet to become apparent.
Although he had anticipated his loss when he voted for healthcare reform, Hill didn’t just give up. The Democratic establishment had plenty of experimental election techniques, including a particularly controversial tactic that caused rage in several races across the country. Near the end of the election, Democrats sent out mail in support of Libertarian candidates. Ostensibly, voters supporting the Libertarian Party would be sourced from a group that would otherwise vote Republican. Even a once percent vote for Libertarian candidate Greg Knott, “the real conservative,” could significantly affect the outcome of a close race. While the strategy was controversial, it was somewhat effective – a full 5.5% of the vote went to third party candidates. Still, the effort did not affect the outcome of the election, which by then was clear. Democrats did not know that the margin of Young’s victory would be anywhere near as high as it was.
Young’s Campaign Strategy
Young’s rallying cause was responsible government spending, but Young had appeal with a diverse array of conservative groups. Young’s spotless background was already appealing to conservative voters who were drawn by his military service and credentials as a policy consultant.
Young Positions his ideas in context of the grand scheme of things, claiming the election was a battle between “statests — Nancy Pelosi, Baron Hill,” and “those of us who still believe in self-government.” Young’s campaign was centered around his dedication to responsible policymaking and distance from the Washington cliques that dominated the Congress and facilitated the massive expansion of the federal government. Young claimed that hew as tired of watching politicians advocate fiscal responsibility and ignore it once elected and serving.
Beyond his fiscal message, however, lies a traditional conservative candidate. Young received support from the Tea Party for advocating small government, including in areas where government action is largely accepted, such as public education. Young received ardent support from the Christian right thanks to his pro-life rhetoric — Young served on the board of a pro-life ministry. Young’s positions on social issues were understated but apparent enough to capture the support of otherwise reserved religious voters: Young thus appealed to both Bush voters — typical conservatives — and Tea party voters.
Young tied Hill to the Obama administration early and iterated and reiterated Hill’s connections to Democratic leaders. Hill, the leader of the Blue Dogs, ostensibly exercises some independence from the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, his voting record, with the exception of the TARP vote, looks in line with the rest of the Democratic establishment — including healthcare.
Young painted Hill as a healthcare exponent as opposed to the skeptic that Hill actually was during deliberation. He used footage from out of Hill’s dramatic town halls in an advertisement to demonstrate that not only was Hill not listening to the constituency, he acted ‘above’ his constituency and had a rude demeanor towards confused voters. Throughout his campaign Young emphasized quotes such as “and you’re not going to tell me how to run my congressional office” as proof of Hill’s distance from the constituency and disregard for democratic values.
Young’s authenticity was proven by his steadfast dedication to his positions even when untenable — Young remained consistent regarding his skepticism of climate change theory. This helped him energize Indiana voters; only 14 percent of Tea Party supporters agreed that climate warming is a pressing environmental problem. Authenticity energizes voters and worked well against Hill, who stood as a figure of “the establishment” and seemed to go against his own Blue Dog values at the urging of leaders like Pelosi. Young channeled conservative enthusiasm and generated increased voter turnout starting from the primary.
Finances
Hill and Young had opposite approaches with regards to campaign finance. Hill, an established candidate and leading figure among moderate Democrats, had a lot of support from the party establishment which was seeking to retain the seat for Democrats. Eli Lilly was his second largest campaign contributor, among others. Hill raised $2 million, more than Young, but over 50% of his campaign contributions came from PACs. Hill ended the campaign season with almost $400,000 on hand, raising questions as to why he didn’t spend all the money – did Hill anticipate the loss?
Young, on the other hand, raised over $1.5 million from individual contributions alone, taking very little PAC money. His largest campaign contributor was Weaver Popcorn. By limiting PAC contributions, Young added to his fresh and independent image. Young was determined to appear distanced from Washington and for his election to appear as a legitimate call to action by the 9th district voters. Individual contributors gave the appearance of a grassroots movement and widespread voter discontent with the way politics was operating; Hill’s fundraising methods became emblematic of the disengaged, bought-out politician who had little interest in what Indiana voters actually though about substantive policy issues.
Young also borrowed from Barack Obama’s revolutionary fundraising model for his campaign: By focusing on small contribution from a wide audience of individuals, he not only received monthly donations from individuals but was also able to connect them to like-minded contributors. Energized Republicans could get involved and easily link others to campaign material, generating more income for the campaign fund. Hill raised a significant portion of his funds through individual contributions, but did not focus on building a support network of dedicated volunteers and contributors given the preponderance of PAC money ready to help him maintain his seat.
Outside Involvement
Outside groups spent about evenly in support of Hill and Young. The vast majority of money was spent in opposition to both candidates, but more was spent in opposition to Young than Hill. This is expected considering Hill’s connections and Young’s status as a political neophyte.
The DCCC outspent any other group and accounted for most opposition to Young, especially in the form of television advertisements. Despite Hill’s diverse PAC contributors, Young received support from numerous independent issue groups such as American United 4 Life Action and the American Future Fund. the NRCC contributed heavily but not to the extent that the DCCC did in defending Hill. Young’s campaign could be considered more “authentic” because of the wider variety of support, although that supper came from established conservative groups and Tea Party groups such as FreedomWorks who employ subtle methods of gaining voters.
Baron Hill received support from a number of Democratic establishment figures including Vice President Joe Bide, who sponsored a fundraiser for Hill in the Summer. The Indiana Republican Party announced on Facebook that “Joe Biden only campaigns for people like Rep. Baron Hill, who have consistently put the liberal interests of a Democratic agenda ahead of the concerns of his Hoosier constituents.” Hill’s support from the Democratic party seemed to work against him as constituents critical of the Obama Administration began to doubt his distance from Democratic circles even as a Blue Dog.
Support from established figures was characteristic of Hill’s ‘martyr’ image, but Young didn’t go ignored by Republican officials; endorsed by FreedomWorks and the Tea Party, as well as Dan Quayle in the Republican primary, Young had a well-rounded coalition of conservative voters to depend on for fundraising and volunteering. Visits from party leaders like Sarah Palin would attract attention, but also unnecessary controversy. Strict establishment support would also damage his authenticity, and Young was determined to remain unbought and as distant from any federal officeholder’s pockets full of moneybags whenever possible
Campaign Narrative and Young’s Victory
Young was able to achieve great results by pandering to undecided voters, who Hill alienated through his continued defense of his votes on healthcare and stimulus packages. Young understood the appeals of the rhetoric of fiscal responsibility and was able to establish it as a criterion for making legislative decisions. Despite the intense urgency of healthcare reform, urges to repeal the legislation were grounded in fiscal complaints. On the issues, Young appeared consistent, unlike Blue Dog Hill who had multiple audiences to pander too, including the Democratic leadership.
Hill did very little to cultivate a positive image for his campaign. He focused on defending his votes and attacking Young’s campaign. Young also ran a negative campaign, but his background and availability for quoting created the appearance of a desperate incumbent attacking an authentic, legitimate challenger.
Where voters were unwilling to buy Hill’s defense of healthcare and cap-and-trade and what they saw is a rapidly expanding government, Hill appeared belligerent and decidedly unrepresentative. Voters were unconvinced that Hill was really representing their interests well before the primary season, during town halls in 2009 over the cap-and-trade bill.
Controversy fed media speculation. Hill’s lines about voting for healthcare despite the possibility of losing reelection may have created a self-fulfilling prophecy as networks wondered if this was in fact the case. In any sense, Hill admitted that his campaign was weak and announced his sincerest intention to run a disadvantaged campaign.
Young’s defeat of Sodrel in the primaries also generated media buzz; because Sodrel had already defeated Hill and served a term, the upset created interest in Young’s character. He became the newcomer who defeated the Republican establishment, and who was on his way to bring substantive change to the district. He became the newcomer who defeated the Republican establishment, and who was on his way to bring substantive change to the district. The novelty of his candidacy over Sodrel’s probably helped energize Republican voters who benefited from Young’s fresh face in their attempts to recruit undecided voters. He may have benefited from additional turnout; voters who were upset with the domination of district politics by only a few names may otherwise not have voted in the election, and this is one likely reason for the large margin over Hill.
Young’s more radical ideas (the elimination of Social Security, restructuring the federal government) were overshadowed by his ability to limit debate to questions of government spending.
In short, Young was able to provide a compelling narrative for voters. In the voting booth, voters drew from Young’s impressive service background as well as his newness to the political arena. Young represented someone who wanted Change in Washington, where as Hill represented both the Obama adminstration and the waning legacy of Hamilton. Young tied fiscal responsibility into all but the most irrelevant issues — spending questions were proxy questions for all issues including healthcare and cap-and-trade, among others.
Young fit archetypes that have draw political support for centuries, becoming the 9th district’s champion against the looming forces of large government. The economic downturn Indianians were experience primed voters to respond to his fiscal rhetoric; Young’s campaign was focused on getting the government under control and in the midst of a recession fallout where all facets of American Life (gas prices? MTV’s “The Hills?) seemed out of control. The promise of stability is alluring.
Takeaway
The conditions on which Young won are not permanent, but his candidacy offers some lessons for future election cycles: Young as a testament to the success of new models of fundraising dependent on individual contributors who “subscribe” to a campaign and contribute at regular intervals. He demonstrated the continuing value of a fresh face and a public service background that conferred policy experience, but not corruption.
Hill’s campaign offered lessons as well, mostly in the form of mistakes not to be repeated. His campaign cements the concept of narrative as key for electoral victory — Hill lacked a complete story. HE spent most of his time defending his decisions, taking responsibility for them even if that meant he lost the election; his campaign narrative was not goal-oriented founded on any appealing notions. The question of Hill on the ballot was one of forgiveness and not one of opportunity, which only perpetuated resentment against Hill’s votes in session.
In retrospect it becomes clear how Young achieved such a large margin of victory. The race was labeled as a toss-up mostly because of the unusually large number of undecided voters who didn’t even know who Young was, but weren’t happy with Hill’s performance, either. Given the direction of the election, it should have been obvious that Young would have won even if the Democrats deployed tactics such as the third party decoy. Young’s decisive victory in a ‘toss-up’ race is a testament to the power of a strong narrative.
